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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

- vs-

Case No. 9205

JAMES WILLIAM WARWICK,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent adopts appellant's statement of facts,
but will cite and comment upon additional facts in the
course of the argument.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE WRITTEN CONFESSION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
COMMIT ERROR IN ADMITTING IT.
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POINT II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT BY PLEADING TO THE INFORMATION IN DISTRICT COURT WAIVED ANY
IRREGULARI'TY OF PROCEDURE AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 24A TO THE
JURY.
POINT VI
ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESS ROBERT COIL WAS A PROPER
EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND, THEREFORE, NOT ERROR.
POINT VII
THE ST ATE.'S ASKING THE DEFENDANT IF
HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR ASSAULT TO
KILL WAS PROPER CROSS EXAMINATION
AND NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WRITTEN CONFESSION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
COMMIT ERROR IN ADMITTING IT.
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Respondent in its brief will take the liberty to respond
to Point III of appellant's brief first, then to Point II, and
third to Point I in that order, since Points I and II depend
in large measure on the admissibility of the defendant's
confession, which issue is raised in Point III of appellant's
brief.
The testimony with regard to the confession of the
defendant (Exhibit P) as elicited from Officer Jack Joseph
Good of the Oakland Police, begins in the transcript at page
96 and continues through page 116. Additional testimony
concerning the confession and its voluntariness given by
Officer George Chamberlain, also of the Oakland Police,
begins at page 117 and runs through page 120. Further
testimony concerning the confession obtained from Lt.
J. M. Stevens, begins at page 209 of the transcript and
runs through page 212.
At page 211 the document was offered in evidence..z
objected to on the same page by the defendant and admitta
"
into evidence by the court on page 212.
The defendant's testimony concerning the confession
begins at page 287 and continues through page 292 on direct examination, and is resumed, still on direct, at page
295 and concluded on page 296 of the transcript.
Appellant in his brief argues error in admission of the
confession on the grounds that defendant (1) was not advised of his right to counsel; (2) that no persons besides
OfficeT Good and·defendant were present; (3) it was in the
handwriting of the officer; (4) defendant at the time of the
trial testified he did not read the statement, and (5) that
there was conflicting testimony as to whether the state..
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ment was read aloud by a peace officer to the defendant
on June 10, 1959.
The case of State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d, p.
178, is a landmark case on the law of admissibility of confession in this state. Two pertinent quotations from that
opinion seem relevant:

" * * * We hold that the defendant, as a matter of
right, may give all evidence he has before the
court, pertaining to the voluntariness of a confession before the confession is received in evidence;
and that the court must base its ruling on the competency of the confession as evidence upon all testimony on the question adduced by both state and
defendant. If on a consideration of all the evidence
on the matter the court does not find the confession
to be voluntary it should be excluded as incompetent. To hold otherwise does violence to the constitutional provision that an accused may not be
compelled to give evidence against himself."
The court earlier in its opinion cited with approval
the case of Osborne v. People, 83 Colo. 4, 262 Pac. 892, 901
in the following language:
"If this is true, it follows that where the court is in
doubt whether the confession was voluntary or
not, the evidence may be admitted, leaving it to the
jury to determine the weight to which it is entitled
under all the circumstances." (Emphasis added)
It is clear from a reading of the pages of the transcript
above cited that defendant was given ample opportunity to
put on all his evidence concerning the manner of the taking,
the time, the place, and the witnesses connected with the
confession in issue. Indeed, appellant does not complain
that he was prevented from impeaching the document, but
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rather, claims that he succeeded in proving it to be inadmissible because not voluntary. It is to be further observed that each of the grounds upon which appellant relies as the basis for involuntariness runs rather to weight
and credibility of the document. This Court, in the Crank
case, supra, spelled out the test of voluntariness in the
following language:
"*

* * In laying a foundation for offering the writ-

ing, if a written confession, or conversation, if
an oral confession, the state will of course be required to show the ti'me and place of the conversation, or the writing and signing of the instrument,
and also what is generally called a prima facie
showing that it was the free and voluntary act of
the accused. Then when the conversation or writing
is offered, is the time for the accused to make objection to its competency. When such objection is
made, the court will hear all the evidence pertaining to that question and itself determine its voluntariness as a matter of law-that is, the competency
of the offered evidence. Unless the parties stipulate
to the contrary, this evidence had best be taken
without the presence of the jury. * * *"
In thus indicating the requirements for the foundation, it is
to be noted the court says nothing about advising the accused of his right to counsel. It says nothing about who
shall write the confession, nor does it say how many witnesses must be present or whether the document must
be read aloud to, or silently read by, the defendant. Rather,
the State has the burden of showing the time, the place,
and the signing of the instrument, together with absence
of threats or inducements. From the testimony of all the
above noted witnesses in this case, the State amply has
shown these elements. A review of the transcript pages
above cited referring to the confession show:
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Officer Frank Edwin Steinbrenner: This witness testi-

fied that the defendant on the 30th day of May, 1959, called
to him and said "I'm going to pin a feather in your·cap,"
to which the witness replied, "How is that?", and the defendant responded, "Well, I wanted to tell you that I
killed a man," whereupon the witness summoned Detective Good. (T. 93).
Detective Jack Joseph Good: This witness established

that on May 30, 1959, at the Oakland Jail, in the interrogation room, he had a conversation with the defendant; that
no one else was present. (T. 96). The conversation occurred
approximately 12:00 noon. (T. 97).
Defendant at this point objected to further testimony
fro:m this witness on the grounds of "no proper foundation." The judge dismissed the jury and the matter was
argued. (T. 97-101). The jury was recalled and the witness
repeated the conversation between himself and the defendant. Exhibit P was then marked and given to the
witness, who established the date (May 30, 1959), the
place, who was present and how it was prepared. Specifically he said that the witness wrote the statement in his
own handwriting, writing a paragraph at a time. He "read
back" each paragraph to the defendant for approval and
then proceeded. Finally, having finished the statement,
he handed it to defendant and asked the defendant to read
it. (T. 101-102).
After defendant had "appeared" to have finished reading the statement, the witness called an Officer Chamberlain. The transcript at page 104, line 3, reads as follows:
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"Q. Was any statement made to the defendant at

that time, with regard to the truthfulness of the
statement?''
"A. Yes.
''Q: What was said?
"A. He was asked if this was a voluntary statement
freely given without promises, force or threats, or
promises of leniency.
"Q. What did the defendant say?
"A. He said it was.
"Q·: Was this in the presence of yourself and Of-

ficer Chamberlain?
"A. It was."

The witness then testified that the defendant signed the
statement and that Officer Chamberlain also signed the
statement after the defendant. (T. 104).
Approximately a week later the witness again saw
the defendant in company with officers from the Ogden
Police Department, and asked the defendant if the statement (Exhibit P) were true. The statement "was read to
him in its entirety" and the defendant agreed it was correct. Additional writing to this effect was added to the
exhibit and the defendant again signed it in the presence
of the Ogden officer. (T. 105).
On cross examination the witness said the total conversation and writing of Exhibit P took from one and
one-half to two hours, and that Chamberlain was present
not more than the last 15 minutes. (T. 109). Also, on cross
examination, the foll6wing testimony appears at page 112
in the transcript, lines 24 through 30, and page 113, lines 1
through 6:
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"Q. Now I take it that the language of this state-

ment-the words used and so forth-are words that
you chose and you put down, following what he
told you; is that right?
A. I attempt to follow the Defendant's wording as
closely as possible.
Q. He didn't dictate this though?

A. No, he did not.
Q. And none of the writing here on it, except the

signatures as you pointed out, are in his writing?
A. That is correct.
Q. Do I understand correctly that, as you wrote it,
you would finish a single paragraph and then read
that aloud?
A. Yes.''
The witness was asked if he told the defendant of his right
to legal counsel. The witness replied he had not; that California procedure did not require it. (T. 113).
Defense coun~el also inquired of this witness about a
conversation concerning the defendant's problem of drinking. (T. 113). On redirect, this witness was asked if he observed the defendant to be sober or under the influence
of narcotics, alcohol, sedation, etc. He replied his observations were that the defendant was not under such influence. (T. 115-116).
Officer George Chamberlain: This witness testified as

follows with regard to the witnessing of the defendant's
signature on Exhibit P. The last paragraph of the statement was read aloud in his presence to the defendant by
Detective Good. The specific words read aloud were:
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"This is a true statement given by me voluntarily
without any force, threats or promises of leniency."
The witness then testified that he saw the defendant sign
the statement and that he, the witness, then read the
statement and signed it himself.

Lt. J. M. Stephens: This witness testified that on the
6th day of June, 1959, at 3:00 p.m. in the presence of Detective Good and Sgt. Bruestle (Ogden Police Department)
and the defendant at the Oakland City Jail, there was a
conversation. (T. 209). The witness told the defendant:
"We would like you, if you would Mr. Warwick,
we would like you to read this statement (Exhibit
P) and if it is correct we would like you to make a
notation attached to it to the effect it is correct and
sign it in our presence."
The witness further told the defendant he did not have
to do those things. Defendant then wanted to know why.
The witness explained the defendant would likely go to
trial and that the witness, together with Sgt. Bruestle,
would probably be a witness, and by watching the defendant sign such a statement, they could then testify to
it. (T. 210).
The testimony at page 210 of the transcript, beginning
at line 117, reads as follows:
"Q. Then what did you do?

A. He finally agreed to the situation. I handed him
the statement, and asked him to read it.
Q. What did he do?

A. He picked up the statement and looked at it,
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looked at each page, turned them over. After he
got through he handed the statement back, and I
asked him if that was true and correct. The way it
was written. He said yes.
Q. Did he appear to be reading it?

A. He appeared to be reading it.
Q. Then what did you do?

A. I asked him if ~ would make the notation, on
the back of it, to the effect that he had read it voluntarily, and that it was a true and correct statement.
Q. What did he say?

A. He said: 'No, I don't want to do that.' He said:
'You do it.'
Q. What did you do then?

A. I turned it over, and wrote the notation on the
back.
Q. What did you do then?

A. After that was done, I handed the statement back
to him.
Q. Then what?

A. And he signed it. And I signed it as a witness
and Sergeant Bruestle signed it as a witness.
Q. The notation that you made. on it, do you know
whether he read it? Or appeared to read it? Or
whether it was read to him?

A. I read it to him.
Q. I show you page 6-what is marked with a num-

eral 6, of State's Exhibit P-and ask you if you recognize any of the writing upon that page?
A. That is my writing."
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At this point, having identified all the writing on the document, the State offered Exhibit P in evidence. Defendant
objected and the Court received it in evidence. (T. 211-212).
The matters of faulty eyesight, inconsistency of memory of witnesses, etc. were extensively inquired into by appellant's counsel and the Court was fully informed of all
the evidence, both of the State and the defendant concerning the voluntariness of this confession. Thereupon the
Court admitted the document. Such admisssion respondent
contends was a legitimate and proper exercise of the trial
court's discretion. While it may be true that all of the
evidence concerning voluntariness under the Crank holding would have better been heard out of the jury's presence, neither party so moved the court, and in view of the
fact that the court admitted the document, all of such
evidence under the Crank holding could have properly
been received by the jury anyway. The wording in the
Crank case that is relevant is as folllows:
"* * * Unless the parties stipulate to the contrary,
this evidence had best be taken without the presence of the jury. This is wisdom, since if the confession is excluded, and the state has sufficient
other evidence to take the case to the jury, the
confession itself and all the evidence which led to
its exclusion would not be proper for the consideration of the jury, and if heard by it, ·might well be
the determining factor in reaching a verdict. * * *
If on the other hand, the state has shown the confession was voluntary as a matter of law, the court
admits it in evidence, and it is then for the consideration of the jury for what it is worth together
with all the other evidence submitted to it. The
court having decided the confession is competent
and may be received in evidence, the state need not
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then further assume the burden of showing its voluntariness before the jury. The defendant may put
in evidence to the jury all the facts and circumstances under which the statements were made to
enable the jury to determine its credibility and the
weight to be given to it. The state may also offer
testimony to the jury on that matter by way of
showing that the statements were freely made and
therefore entitled to great weight and full credit."
This Court has repeatedly upheld in the cases of
Mares v. Hill, 118 Utah 484, 222 P.2d 811, p. 815; State v.
Braasch, et al., 119 Utah 450, 229 P.2d 289 at 293, and
State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 529, 230 P.2d 559, at 564, that
failure to advise tile defendant of his right to counsel does
not in itself make the confession involuntary.
In the case of State v. Ashdown, 5 U.2d 59, 296 P.2d
726 at 729, this Court said in part:
"Although the burden of proof as to the voluntariness of the confession lies with the party seeking
to use it as evidence, i.e., the prosecution, after the
trial court has decided from the evidence that the
confession was voluntarily made, the appellate
court will not disturb that finding in the absence
of a showing of abuse of its discretion where there
is substantial evidence from which it could reasonably so find."
It is submitted from the above review of the testimony
(quite apart from the self serving statements of the defendant at the trial about his poor eyesight, etc., referred to
above) there is ample evidence that the statement was
voluntarily made and the admission of Exhibit P into
evidence by the trial court was a proper exercise of discretion. Indeed, appellant makes no specific assignment
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
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POINT II
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT.
Appellant argues that the only evidence of premeditation and deliberation in evidence in the trial of this case
was the defendant's own confession, and argues that "some
other evidence" of premeditation besides the confession,
is necessary to supply this essential element of the State's
case. As respondent understands it, appellant argues that
defendant's testimony at the trial and a proper construction
of defendant's confession (Exhibit P) indicate that this
death was the simple result of a struggle or a fight between
two "half drunk" participants, of which the decedent was
the original aggressor, and that no specific intent to kill,
or premeditation or deliberation to take a life occurred until after the fight began.
As admitted by appellant in his brief, the cause of
death, as testified to by Dr. Warren A. Bennett, was drowning (T. 81), and not the result of blows received by decedent on his head. Dr. Bennett in fact testified that such
blows may or may not have caused unconsciousness.
(T. 79).
At page 3 of defendant's confesssion (Exhibit P) are
found the words:
"I hit him behind the left ear after swing him
around with my left hand. He dropped and he was
unconscious. I hit him eight or nine more times
while he was lying helpless on the ground. He did
not make any movements."
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Resuming from page 4:
"When the fight first started I had not intended to
kill this man but once I hit him I decided I would
finish his life. To make certain of his death there
was a creek about 5 feet below from where we
fought. I dragged the body by one leg. The man
way lying on his back. I dragged him down an incline and dragged the body into the creek. There
was a pool of water about 3 or 4 feet iri depth. I
jerked the body into the creek where the pool of
water was and turned the body over so that the
face would be down and he would be sure to drown
if he ·were alive."
·
While these statements differ with the testimony of the
defendant at the time of the trial, since both were admissible the jury was at full liberty to choose which account or
what parts of each it would believe. Clearly, if the jury
chose to believe the account written in Exhibit P, those
statements above quoted from Exhibit P demonstrate a deliberate desire to take the life of one obviously observed
to be unconscious. Further, if the jury also believed that
the defendant did the deliberate, planned act of turning
McCall face down in the water so that he "would be sure
to drown if he were alive,'' it would be justified in determining that there was premeditation and deliberation.
Appellant in his brief implies that the elements of premeditation and deliberation had to occur prior to the
scuffle which led to the decedent's being knocked unconscious; that absent any such premeditation at that point,
a verdict of first degree murder is untenable. Such an interpretation, to be valid, would require the decedent to
have been killed as a result of the blows on the head, and
death to have occurred either at the time or inevitably and
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immediately thereafter from that sole cause. As indicated
above, however, the cause of death was not the blows to
the head inflicted by defendant with his wrench in hand,
but rather from drowning.
If, therefore, the jury believed that there was an appreciable period of time, as indicated in Exhibit P, following defendant's rendering the decedent helpless during
which the defendant deliberated and meditated and determined to take further steps to snuff out the decedent's
life, as observed above, the jury would be justified in returning a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. The
Court, in Instruction No. 7, properly defined the words
"deliberate" and "premeditate" and correctly stated the
Utah law in that connection. The Court said in part:
" 'Premediate' means the act of meditating, contriving or designing beforehand for any length of
time. The time must be sufficient, however, for
some reflection on and consideration of the act in
contemplation during which the alternative choices
of killing and not killing are debated in the mind
of the actor for the formation of a definite purpose
to kill. When the lapse of time is sufficient for this
purpose, it matters not how short the time may be.
Whether or not a premeditated design to kill was
formed must be determined from all the facts and
circumstances of the case, including the mental
condition of the defendant."
The court further instructed the jury in Instruction
No. 9 that premeditation and deliberation could not be
presumed from the mere fact of killing.
Appellant relies in support of his position on the Wyoming case of State v. Martinez, 342 P.2d 227, where a first
degree murder verdict was found by a jury and set aside
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16

by the Wyoming Supreme Court on the basis that defendant's confession was the only evidence of premeditation
and deliberation, and upon viewing. the confession as a
whole there were no statements which could be reasonably
construed to give rise to premeditation or deliberation. Specifically in his confession defendant said only that he was
acting out of fear for his own life. Such is not the case in
the confession before this court, and, in particular, the
statements cited earlier in this point. Respondent contends,
therefore, that the Martinez case gives no aid and comfort
to appellant, since statements indicating deliberation and
premeditation clearly appear in defendant's confession.
It is also to be observed that the court properly instructed the ·jury in· Instruction No. 30 that they were to
view the confession of defendant admitted into evidence
with proper caution and in connection with all the surrounding circumstances.
The only issue in this case is whether the jury should
have believed the statements in the confession as opposed
to the testimony of the defendant at the time of the trial,
and appellant himself concedes that it is the jury's prerogative to choose which version of the facts it prefers to
believe.
The jury in this case was properly instructed that it
was to determine the existence or lack of existence of premeditation and deliberation from all the facts and circumstances of the case, and since in fact the jury has so determined, and since in fact there was competent evidence
before the jury from which such a determination could be
made, and hence no abuse of its discretion on the part of
the jury, this Court should not overturn that verdict.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
This Court has repeatedly held 7 most recently in the
case of State v. Iverson, -Utah-, 350 P.2d 152, that so
long as there was competent evidence unon which a jury
TR•A~
might return a verdict of guilty, the~Court cannot dismiss
a criminal information on the grounds of insufficiency of
evidence.
The court in the Iverson case said:
"The law involved is ably discussed in the opinion
of Justice Wolfe in State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63,
157 P.2d 258. The controlling principle is that upon
such a motion the evidence is to be viewed most
favorably to the state, and if when so viewed, the
jury acting fairly and reasonably could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge
is required to submit the case· to the jury for determination of the guilt or innocenee of defendant."
In the case of State v. Penderville, 2 U.2d 281, 272 P.2d
195, the court said.
''* * * It has been repeatedly held by this court that
upon a motion to dis\miss or to direct a verdict of
not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court
does not consider the weight of the evidence or
credibility of the witnesses, but determines the
naked legal proposition of law, whether there is
any substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused,
and all reasonable inferences are to be taken in
favor of the state. * * * (Cases cited) As is pointed
out in one or more of these cases, the trial court has
a discretion in the case of a motion for a new trial
that it does not have in case of a motion to dismiss
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or to direct a verdict of not guilty. Nevertheless, in
either case if there is before the court evidence upon
which reasonable men might differ as to whether
the defendant is or is not guilty, he may deny the
motion.''
In the case of State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 366 Pac.
261,_ an adultery prosecution where defendant made a motion for a directed verdict, which motion is equivalent to
the motion to dismiss under consideration here, the court
said:
"In 16 C'.J. 935, the conclusions of various courts
are condensed in the statement:
'As a general rule the court should direct a verdict
of acquittal * * * where there is no competent evidence reasonably tending to sustain the charge;
or where the evidence is undisputed and so weak
that a conviction would be attributable to passion
or prejudice, or where it is so slight and indeterminate that a verdict of guilty would be set aside, as
where the evidence consists solely of the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, or is insufficient
to overcome the presumption of innocense, or to
show defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
But the case should be submitted to the jury and
the court should not direct a verdict of acquittal,
if there is any evidence to support or reasonably
tending to support the charge, as where it is sufficient to overcome prima facie the presumption
of innocense, or where the evidence of a material
nature is conflicting.' (Emphasis added)
From Pace v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 560, 186
S.W. 142, we quote the syllabus on this point as
follows:
'It is only in the absence of any evidence tending
to establish the guilt of the accused that the trial
court will be authorized to grant a peremptory in-
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struction directing his acquittal.'
The same principle is decided in State v. Gross,
Ohio St. 161, 110 N.E. 466.
An able discussion and determination of the bounds
of judicial authority in considering a motion for a
directed verdict is contained in Isbell v. U.S. 142
C.C.A. 312, 227 F. 788, in which it is made clear
that the court in such case does not consider the
weight of evidence or credibility of witnesses but
determines the naked legal proposition of law
whether there is any substantial evidence of the
guilt of the accused. This is undoubtedly the correct
rule. See annotation 'Directing Acquittal,' 17 A.L.R.
910. The function of a court in dealing with an application for a directed verdict must not be confused with that in considering a motion for a new
trial u pan the grounds of insufficiency of evidence.
The court has a discretion in the latter case which
he does not properly have in the former. The reason
for the distinction is. that the order sought in one
case acquits the accused and finally ends the prosecution, while in the other, the order, if granted,
does not discharge the accused but merely gives
him the advantage and benefit of another trial. The
rule is controlled by the same principles in criminal cases as in civil procedure. And in a civil case,
Stam v. Ogden P. & P. Co., 53 Utah 248, 177 P. 218,
this court said:
'It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction and perhaps in nearly every other where the jury system
prevails, that, if there is any substantial evidence
whatever upon which to base a verdict, the court
will not withdraw the case from the jury or direct
what their verdict should be'."
Since, as observed in the previous points argued, there
is competent and substantial evidence in Exhibit P alone
from which a jury could have returned (and in fact did
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return) a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, as a
matter of law the trial court did not err in denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT BY PLEADING TO THE INFORMATION IN DISTRICT COURT WAIVED ANY
IRREGULARITY OF PROCEDURE AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING STAGE.
The appellant in this case has not filed a designation
of the record on· appeal and the transcript of the preliminary hearing in this trial was not included in the record
on appeal, and respondent, accordingly, has no opportunity
to review the defects in the preliminary hearing to which
appellant refers in Point IV of his brief. The substance of
appellant's argument, however, was that the written confession (Exhibit P) was improperly admitted into evidence
at the preliminary hearing.
In spite of the absence of the preliminary hearing
transcript, the controlling Utah statute (77-16-2, U.C.A.
1953) eliminates this point from being properly considered
by this Court in the following language:
"No defect or irregularity in or want or absence
of any proceeding or statutory requirement, prior
to the filing of an information or indictment, including the prelimi~ry hearing, shall constitute
prejudicial error and the defendant shall be conclusively presumed to have waived any such defect,
irregularity, want or absence of proceeding or statutory requirement, unless he shall before pleading
to the information or indictment specifically and
expressly object to the information or indictment
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on such ground.- Whenever the consent of the state
to any waiver by the defendant is required, such
consent shall be conclusively presumed, unless the
state before or at the time the defendant pleads to
the information or indictment expressly objects to
such waiver."
This statute has been cited and upheld in State v. Crank,
supra, p. 181. Since in this case defendant entered a plea
of not guilty to the information filed in the District Court,
he thus waived his objection to any irregularity in the
preliminary hearing and said defects are not now appealable before this body.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR
IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 24A TO THE
JURY.
Appellant argues error not on the basis that Instruction 24A is an incorrect statement of the law with regard to
the question of self defense and subsequent aggression, but
rather that it is incomplete. Appellant argues that the
Court should have further instructed the jury that the
defendant, having rendered the decedent helpless, had no
affirmative duty thereafter to go to his aid. Respondent
contends that such a proposed instruction would not deal
directly with and would not be a proper part of the subject
treated by Instruction 24A.
The matter of giving instructions or refusing same has
long been held the province of the trial court, 3 Am. Jur.,
para. 971, 74 ALR 841. In criminal cases the courts have
held that the verdict of the jury will not be overturned for
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failure of trial court to give an instruction unless such
failure co·nstitutes prejudicial error. In that connection in
the case of People v. Davis, 43, Cal. 2d 661, 176 P.2d 801 at
808, the Supreme Court of the State of California said:
"Reviewing courts will scrutinize with great care
any claim of prejudicial error predicated solely
upon the omission of the trial court to give of its
own motion and instruction, the propriety of which
is indicated solely by the condition of the evidence.
Prejudicial error will be held to exist if, upon an
examination of the entire record * * * (cases cited)
it appears that the giving of the instructions was
vital to a proper disposition of the case." (Emphasis
added).
In the Davis case, defendant was tried for performing
abortions and on appeal defense counsel argued prejudicial
error on the grounds that the trial court failed to instruct
the jury that a specific witness was an accomplice, whose
testimony needed corroboration.
This court has spoken on the subject of prejudicial
error most recently in the case of State v. Neal, 1 U.2d 122~
262 P.2d 756. The opinion reads in part:
"We will not reverse criminal causes for mere error
or irregularity. It is only when there has been error
which is both substantial and prejudicial to the
rights of the accused that a reversal is warranted.'~
The c·ourt then cites Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, which
provides:
"After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. If
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error has been committed, it shall not be presumed
to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be
satisfied that it has that effect before it is warr~nted
in reversing the judgment."
While it is the function of the appellate court to determine in each fact situation what is prejudicial, respondent herein submits that a fair inference which 12 reasonable jurors, independent of any instruction, might well
make, is that a defendant who is attacked and defends
himself quite naturally has neither the inclination nor the
duty to go to the aid of a helpless attacker. It is further
suggested that to constitute prejudicial error, it must be
demonstrated that the trial court in failing to give such an
instruction to the jury has committed such error that had
the instruction been given, the jury would have returned
a different verdict. See People v. Lopez, 32 Cal. 2d673, 197
P.2d 757 at 759. Respondent contends that this Court may
reasonably determine that had such an instruction as requested by defendant been given to the jury, the verdict
would have been the same and that absent instruction,
the jurors may well have considered that the defendant
had no duty to go to the aid of McCall.
It must be further observed that the jury apparently
chose to believe the statements appearing in defendant's
confession which, if believed, made the question of going
to the aid of the decedent moot in that they illustrate conduct of the opposite nature. That is, he affirmatively took
•
steps to insure McCall's death after rendering him helpless.
Counsel for appellant cites no case authority to demonstrate that there is no duty to go to the aid of a helpless
assailant. Adopting for a moment the defendant's theory
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that a scuffle occurred and that at the end of the altercation defendant discovered McCall lying face down in the
water unconscious, and thereafter left the scene, respondent submits this is not merely abandoning someone who is
helpless, but more an adandonment of someone who is helpless and in dire peril of losing his life. Whether the same
lack of duty to go to the aid obtains in such a situation
remains to be demonstrated. Counsel for defendant in taking exception to the Court's failure to give such an instruction at the time of the trial did not demonstrate the validiy
of such a proposed instruction and has not so demonstrated
on appeal, but has done no more than suggest such an instruction should have been given.
Accordingly respondent contends that no error was
committed by the trial court in giving Instruction 24A.
POINT VI
ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESS ROBERT· COIL WAS A PROPER
EXERCISE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION AND, THEREFORE, NOT ERROR.
POINT VII

.,

THE STATE'S ASKING THE. DEFENDANT IF'
HE HAD BEEN ARRESTED FOR ASSAULT TO
KILL WAS PROPER CROSS EXAMINATION
AND NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR .

The remaining two points of this brief have to do with
alleged errors committed during the course of the trial in
the admitting of the testimony of the witness Robert Coil
and in permitting the State on cross examination to ask
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the defendant if his arrest in Oakland had been on the
charge of "assault to kill." Under the doctrine of discretion of the trial court cited above (3 Am. Jur., para. 971)
and the ruling in the Neal case, supra, the question of
admissibility of evidence or propriety ·of questions asked
is a discretionary matter for the trial judge, and in the
absence of showing prejudice to the rights of the accused,
there is no reversible error. Appellant argues that testimony of the witness Coil was too indefinite an identification. He cites the case of Phillips v. State, 297 S.W.2d. 135,
in support of his argument. It must be observed in that case
the identification by the witness supplied an essential element of the crime connecting the defendant with the robbery. In the case before this court, the identification by
the witness Coil, if believed, tended to show no more than
that the decedent and the defendant had been seen together prior to the crime. The jury could well have reached
its verdict without the testimony of this witness. Defense
Counsel had ample opportunity to impeach this witness
and did so, and it Q proper exetcise of the court's discretion to permit the testimony to go to the jury to be
given what weight, if any, the jury might choose.
In the transcript at page 296, the defendant on direct
examination stated:
"I was arrested for drunk and disturbing the peace
at my ex wife's home."
He had earlier testified that his ex wife's home was located
in Oakland, California. On cross examination counsel for
the State inquired into the conduct of the defendant at his
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sel for the defendant objected and the court overruled the
objection, finding that such questions were proper cross
examination. In the course of such cross examination the
State twice asked the defendant if in fact his arrest was
for assault to kill and that the charge had been reduced
to disturbing the peace, to which he plead guilty. The
defendant denied the charge of assault to kill, but admitted
pleading guilty to the offense of disturbing the peace and
being sentenced to 30 days. A reading of the record indicates that the subject of defendant's arrest was raised during the course of the direct examination; and the questions
objected to on cross, while perhaps prejudicial, were nonetheless proper cross e~amination. The court accordingly
did not abuse its discretion.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, respondent submits that
the verdict and judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE

Attorney General
GORDON A. MADSEN

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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